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Capabilities	for	All?	
From	Capabilities	to	Function,	to	Capabilities	to	Control	
Jessica	Begon	Nuffield	College,	University	of	Oxford	jessica.begon@nuffield.ox.ac.uk	(Draft.	Final	version	available	in	Social	Theory	and	Practice	(2017).)		
Abstract:	The	capability	approach	aims	to	ensure	all	individuals	are	able	to	form	and	
pursue	 their	 own	 conception	 of	 the	 good,	 whilst	 the	 state	 remains	 neutral	 between	
them,	 and	 has	 done	 much	 to	 include	 oppressed	 and	 marginalised	 groups.	 Liberal	
neutrality	and	social	inclusivity	are	worthy	goals,	yet	I	argue	that	Martha	Nussbaum’s	
influential	 formulation	 of	 the	 capability	 approach,	 at	 least,	 cannot	 meet	 them.	
Conceptualising	capabilities	as	opportunities	to	perform	specific,	valuable	functionings	
fails	to	accommodate	those	who	do	not	value,	or	cannot	perform,	these	functionings.	I	
therefore	propose	that	the	capability	approach	be	modified,	such	that	capabilities	are	
conceptualised,	instead,	as	opportunities	to	exercise	control	in	certain	central	domains	
of	our	life.		
	
Keywords:	 Capability	 approach,	 autonomy,	 liberalism,	 perfectionism,	 neutrality,	disability.			
1.	Introduction		The	 development	 of	 the	 capability	 approach	 has	 been	 motivated	 by	 a	 concern	 to	ensure	that	all	individuals	have	the	substantive	opportunity	to	lead	a	decent	human	life.	 By	 focussing	 on	 opportunities,	 or	 capabilities,	 the	 approach	 avoids	 “push[ing]	citizens	into	certain	valued	ways	[of	life]”.1	Thus,	it	aims	to	achieve	the	liberal	goal	of	allowing	individuals	to	autonomously	form	and	pursue	their	own	conception	of	the	good.	 Further,	 its	 proponents	 claim	 that	 it	 better	 promotes	 this	 capacity	 for	 every	person	than	alternative	approaches.	Thus,	capability	theorists	oppose	resourcism	for	failing	to	acknowledge	that	different	 individuals	need	different	resource	bundles	to	have	the	same	opportunities,	and	oppose	utilitarianism	for	ignoring	the	separateness	of	persons,	and	the	right	of	each	person	to	have	the	chance	to	lead	a	good	life.	Many	capability	theorists	have	also	been	at	the	forefront	of	efforts	to	include	the	concerns	of	 oppressed	 and	marginalised	 groups	 in	 the	 discussion	 about	 distributive	 justice,	
																																																						1	Martha	Nussbaum,	 ‘Human	Functioning	and	Social	 Justice:	 In	Defence	of	Aristotelian	Essentialism’,	
Political	Theory	20	(1992):	202-246,	p.225.		
		 2	
including	women,	 sexual	minorities,	 those	 in	 developing	 countries,	 and	 those	with	physical	and	cognitive	impairments.			These	are	worthy	goals,	yet	I	argue	that,	as	it	stands,	the	capability	approach	has	not	been	formulated	in	a	way	that	ensures	that	it	is	fully	inclusive,	and	neutral	regarding	the	 conception	 of	 the	 good	 to	 be	 pursued.	 Specifically,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 Martha	Nussbaum’s	 influential	 formulation	 of	 the	 capability	 approach,	 and	 argue	 that	 her	identification	 of	 centrally	 valuable	 functionings,	 and	 her	 conceptualisation	 of	capabilities	as	 the	opportunity	to	perform	these	functionings,	undermines	 the	 liberal	neutrality	 and	 inclusivity	 of	 her	 approach.2	I	 therefore	 propose	 that	 the	 capability	approach	be	modified,	and	our	understanding	of	capabilities	broadened:	we	should	have	 capabilities	 to	 control	 central	 domains	 of	 our	 life,	 rather	 than	 capabilities	 to	function.			As	a	political	liberal,	although	Nussbaum	identifies	central	functionings	–	activities	or	states	of	being	that	are	valuable	in	any	human	life	–	she	“would	not	be	prepared	to	commend	 [them]	 as	 law	 in	 the	 public	 realm”3.	 Thus,	 her	 approach	 (which	 I	 will	outline	in	§2)	aims	to	maintain	state	neutrality,	and	include	those	who	do	not	share	her	 conception	 of	 the	 good.	 Yet	 I	will	 argue	 that	 she	 does	 not	 sufficiently	 insulate	public	 policy	 from	 substantive	 judgements	 about	 the	 good,	 and	 that	 her	understanding	of	capabilities	as	opportunities	to	function	means	that	her	approach	is	not	appropriate	to	the	lives	and	experiences	of	all	(§3).	Specifically,	I	will	argue	that	individuals	who	do	not	value,	or	cannot	perform,	the	functionings	considered	central	by	Nussbaum	will	 either:	 be	 entitled	 (as	 a	matter	 of	 justice)	 to	 opportunities	 they	cannot	 actually	 exercise,	 and	 not	 to	 those	 that	would	 enable	 them	 to	 pursue	 their	conception	of	the	good;	or	offered	treatments	that	entail	“expressive	subordination”4	of	their	way	of	life.	Neither	of	these	alternatives	is	desirable.		Nonetheless,	 I	 do	 not	 believe	 these	 problems	 are	 endemic	 to	 all	 versions	 of	 the	capability	approach.	Thus,	unlike	other	commentators,	my	response	is	not	to	suggest	that	 we	 abandon	 capabilities	 for	 resources, 5 	or	 abandon	 the	 extensive	 list	 of	capabilities,	which	Nussbaum	has	championed,	for	a	minimal,	or	‘thin’,	one.6	Instead,	
																																																						2	For	simplicity	 I	 focus	on	Nussbaum	throughout,	but	a	similar	criticism	could	be	raised	against	any	approach	that	understands	capabilities	as	opportunities	to	perform	valuable	functionings.		3	Martha	Nussbaum,	Sex	and	Social	Justice	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1999),	p.22	4	Martha	Nussbaum,	 ‘Perfectionist	Liberalism	and	Political	Liberalism’,	Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs	39	(2011):	3-45,	p.35	5	Ian	Carter,	‘Is	the	Capability	Approach	Paternalist?’,	Economics	and	Philosophy	30	(2014):	75-98	6	Rutger	Claassen	and	Marcus	Düwell,	 ‘The	Foundations	of	Capability	Theory:	Comparing	Nussbaum	and	 Gewirth’,	 Ethical	 Theory	 and	 Moral	 Practice	 16	 (2013):	 493-510;	 Ben	 Colburn,	 ‘Disadvantage,	Autonomy,	and	the	Continuity	Test’,	Journal	of	Applied	Philosophy	31	(2014):	254-270	
		 3	
I	argue	that	we	should	alter	how	capabilities	are	conceptualised:	they	should	not	be	understood	as	opportunities	to	perform	particular	functionings,	but	as	opportunities	to	exercise	control	in	certain	central	domains	of	our	life	(§4).	Individuals	should	not,	then,	 simply	have	 the	opportunity	 to	perform	a	 ‘valuable’	 functioning,	or	not.	They	should	have	the	substantive	freedom	to	form	and	pursue	their	own	conception	of	the	good,	 even	 when	 this	 involves	 functioning	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 widely	 considered	disvaluable.	By	not	specifying	centrally	 important	 functionings	but	only	domains	of	choice,	this	approach	allows	individuals	to	exert	genuine	control	over	central	parts	of	their	lives,	regardless	of	the	content	of	their	choices.	However,	by	identifying	central	domains,	 rather	 than	simply	valuing	choice	or	autonomy	per	se,	 the	approach	does	not	slide	into	relativism.		
	
2.	Capabilities,	Liberalism,	and	Perfectionism	
	Nussbaum’s	 capability	 approach	 began	 as	 an	 Aristotelian	 project,	 committed	 to	promoting	a	conception	of	human	flourishing,	and	challenging	culturally	relativistic	positions	 that	 suggested	 “no	 traditional	 practice	 ought	 to	 be	 changed”7.	 More	recently,	 Nussbaum	 has	 embraced	 Rawlsian	 liberalism	 and	 political	 neutrality.	 As	such,	 she	 is	 concerned	 to	 respect	 individuals’	 autonomy,	 and	 aims	 to	 avoid	 “being	dictatorial	about	the	good”8.	Where	certain	functionings	were	once	unapologetically	defended	as	essential	to	a	flourishing	life,	Nussbaum	is	now	clear	that	her	approach	“does	not	rest	on	any	single	account	of	the	good	life”9.			Given	Nussbaum’s	strident	political	 liberalism,	and	her	genuine	concern	to	devise	a	theory	of	 justice	 that	 includes	groups	 that	 are	 frequently	marginalised,10	criticising	her	approach	for	being	perfectionist	and	exclusionary	may	seem	misplaced.	Certainly	I	 am	 not	 suggesting	 that	 Nussbaum	 means	 to	 adopt	 a	 view	 of	 capabilities	 that	excludes	those	whose	conceptions	of	the	good	life	are	deemed	defective	or	inferior.11	However,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 Nussbaum’s	 reliance	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 certain	functionings,	 and	 commitment	 to	 the	 capabilities	 to	 perform	 these	 functionings,	threatens	 the	 neutrality	 and	 inclusivity	 of	 her	 approach.	 First,	 though,	 it	 is	 worth	
																																																						7	Martha	Nussbaum,	‘Public	Philosophy	and	International	Feminism’,	Ethics	8	(1998):	762-796,	p.768	8 	Martha	 Nussbaum,	 Women	 and	 Human	 Development:	 The	 Capabilities	 Approach,	 (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2000),	p.69	9	Eric	Nelson,	‘From	Primary	Goods	to	Capabilities:	Distributive	Justice	and	the	Problem	of	Neutrality’,	
Political	Theory	36	(2008):	93-122,	p.94	10	For	 example,	 disabled	 individuals	 and	 animals	 in	 Frontiers	 of	 Justice;	 and	 women	 and	 sexual	minorities	in	Sex	and	Social	Justice.		11	See,	 for	example,	Nussbaum’s	 ‘Perfectionist	Liberalism	and	Political	Liberalism’,	 for	her	defence	of	political,	over	perfectionist,	liberalism.		
		 4	
outlining	Nussbaum’s	account	and	the	changes	it	has	undergone,	for	those	unfamiliar	with	the	developments	in	her	work.			
2.1	Nussbaum’s	Capability	Approach	
	According	to	capability	 theorists,	 justice	requires	 that	 individuals	be	provided	with	certain	 central	 capabilities,	 which	 comprise	 both	 the	 developed	 psychological	capacity	to	perform	the	requisite	functionings,	and	the	necessary	external	conditions	or	 lack	 of	 physical	 impediments	 to	 performing	 them.12	Nussbaum’s	 approach	 was	novel	 in	 her	 willingness	 to	 identify	 a	 single,	 and	 universally	 valuable,	 list	 of	capabilities.	 Initially,	 Nussbaum	 suggested	 that	 the	 contents	 of	 this	 list	 should	 be	identified	by	considering	 the	central	 features	of	a	human	 life:	 “we	must	ask,	which	things	are	so	important	that	we	will	not	count	a	life	as	a	human	life	without	them?”.13	Her	answer	to	this	question	included	the	need	for	food	and	drink,	shelter,	mobility,	sexual	satisfaction,	practical	reason,	affiliation,	and	play.14			These	 central	 features,	 Nussbaum	 argued,	 cannot	 be	 identified	 independently	 of	human	 experience,	 yet	 “the	 deepest	 examination	 of	 human	 history	 and	 human	cognition	 from	 within…reveals	 a	 more	 or	 less	 determinate	 account	 of	 the	 human	being”15.	 This	 approach	 she	 calls	 ‘internalist	 essentialism’,	 since	we	 can	 determine	the	essential	features	of	a	human	life	without	recourse	to	anything	external	to	human	experience.	 Thus,	 broadly,	 Nussbaum	 argued	 that	 such	 internal	 consideration	 of	human	 nature,	 tested	 through	 discussion	 with	 others,	 will	 lead	 to	 an	 overlapping	consensus	on	those	functionings	we	can	agree	to	be	necessary	to	a	flourishing	life	or,	at	 a	 lower	 threshold,	 a	 minimally	 human	 life.16	She	 then	 argues	 that	 individuals	
																																																						12	Given	 the	wide	 application	 of	 the	 approach,	 it	 is	 worth	 clarifying	 that	my	 focus	 is	 the	 capability	approach	 to	distributive	 justice,	and	by	 ‘capability	 theorists’	 I	mean	those	who	adopt	capabilities	as	the	metric	of	distribution.		13	Nussbaum,	‘Human	Functioning	and	Social	Justice’,	p.206	14	Nussbaum,	‘Human	Functioning	and	Social	Justice’,	pp.217-220.	The	current	complete	list	of	central	capabilities	are,	in	brief,	opportunities	for:	(i)	life;	(ii)	bodily	health;	(iii)	bodily	integrity;	(iv)	senses,	imagination	and	thought;	(v)	emotional	attachments;	(vi)	using	practical	reason;	(vii)	affiliation;	(viii)	interaction	 with	 other	 species;	 (ix)	 play;	 and	 (x)	 control	 over	 one’s	 environment	 (political	 and	material)	 (Martha	 Nussbaum,	 Creating	 Capabilities:	 The	 Human	 Development	 Approach	 (Cambridge	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2011),	pp.33-34).	15	Nussbaum,	‘Human	Functioning	and	Social	Justice’,	p.207	(latter	emphasis	mine)	16	These	thresholds	roughly	align	with	what	citizens	are	entitled	to	from	their	government	(the	higher	threshold),	 and	what	all	 humans	 are	 entitled	 to	 (the	 lower	 threshold)	 (e.g.	 Nussbaum,	Women	and	
Human	 Development,	 p.12;	 p.75;	 p.212).	 On	 some	 interpretations	 of	 Nussbaum’s	 approach	 to	capability	 identification,	 although	 she	believes	proceduralist,	 informed-desire	 accounts	will	coincide	with	her	 substantive	good	approach,	 such	proceduralism	does	no	 serious	 justificatory	work	 (Alison	Jaggar,	 ‘Reasoning	About	Well-Being:	Nussbaum’s	Methods	of	Justifying	the	Capabilities’,	The	Journal	
of	Political	Philosophy	 14	 (2006):	 301-22,	 pp.309-320).	 If	 this	 is	 true,	Nussbaum’s	 approach	 is	 even	more	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 charge	 of	 perfectionism.	 Thus,	 focussing	 on	 the	 overlapping	 consensus	methodology	is	a	more	charitable	interpretation.		
		 5	
should	 have	 the	 capabilities	 to	 perform	 these	 valuable	 functionings:	 “capability	 to	function,	 not	 actual	 functioning,	 should	 be	 the	 goal	 of	 legislation	 and	 public	planning”17.			This	 original,	 more	 explicitly	 perfectionist	 and	 Aristotelian	 formulation	 of	Nussbaum’s	account,	was	subject	to	criticism	from	two	conflicting	viewpoints.	First,	it	was	suggested	 that	 the	perfectionism	of	her	account	 resulted	 in	 the	paternalistic	imposition	of	her	conception	of	flourishing,	which	she	should	avoid.18	Conversely,	it	was	objected	that	if	she	was	committed	to	a	substantive	view	of	flourishing	she	ought	to	 be	 concerned	 with	 the	 functionings	 individuals	 actually	 performed,	 and	 so	whether	they	were	flourishing,	not	whether	they	had	the	capability	to.	Thus,	that	she	should	adopt,	instead,	a	‘functionings	approach’.19			Nussbaum	has	moved	in	the	direction	suggested	by	the	former	line	of	criticism,	and	now	 emphasises	 how	 focussing	 on	 capabilities	 allows	 her	 to	 avoid	 imposing	 a	particular	conception	of	the	good,	and	to	embrace	political	liberalism.	The	capability	approach,	 then,	 is	 now	 explicitly	 political,	 as	 is	 the	 overlapping	 consensus:	we	 are	asked	to	“endorse	the	basic	 ideas	of	the	Capabilities	Approach	 for	political	purposes	
only,	 not	 as	 a	 comprehensive	 guide	 to	 life”20 .	 It	 would,	 Nussbaum	 argues,	 be	“inappropriate	 for	 any	 particular	 comprehensive	 conception	 of	 ethical	 value	 to	 be	endorsed	by	politics”21.	Thus,	although	Nussbaum	retains	the	“evaluative	and	ethical”	element	of	her	approach	and	“asks,	among	the	many	things	that	human	beings	might	develop	 the	 capacity	 to	 do,	 which	 ones	 are	 the	 really	 valuable	 ones”22,	 she	 only	requires	agreement	on	the	answer	for	political	purposes.			
2.2	Nussbaum’s	Central	Capabilities:	Opportunities	to	Flourish	
	Nussbaum	is	clear,	then,	that	in	the	political	realm	we	should	not	endorse	or	enforce	a	 comprehensive	 conception	 of	 the	 good,	 but	 “allow...people	 plenty	 of	 liberty	 to	
																																																						17	Nussbaum,	‘Human	Functioning	and	Social	Justice’,	p.221	18	For	 example:	 Nelson,	 ‘From	 Primary	 Goods	 to	 Capabilities’;	 Carter,	 ‘Is	 the	 Capability	 Approach	Paternalist?’;	 Séverine	Deneulin,	 ‘Perfectionism,	Paternalism	and	Liberalism	 in	 Sen	 and	Nussbaum’s	Capability	 Approach’,	Review	of	 Political	 Economy	 14	 (2002):	 497-518;	 Rutger	 Claassen,	 ‘Capability	Paternalism’,	Economics	and	Philosophy	30	(2014):	57-73;	Jaggar,	‘Reasoning	About	Well-Being’.		19	For	 example:	 Henry	 Richardson,	 ‘Some	 Limitations	 of	 Nussbaum’s	 Capabilities’,	 Quinnipiac	 Law	
Review	19	(2000):	309-332;	Richard	Arneson,	 ‘Perfectionism	and	Politics’,	Ethics	111	(2000):	37-63;	Marc	Fleurbaey,	‘Capabilities,	Functionings	and	Refined	Functionings’,	Journal	of	Human	Development	7	 (2006):	 299-310;	 G.A.	 Cohen,	 ‘Equality	 of	What?	 On	Welfare,	 Goods,	 and	 Capabilities’,	 in:	Martha	Nussbaum	and	Amartya	Sen	(eds.),	Quality	of	Life	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1993):	9-29.		20	Nussbaum,	Creating	Capabilities,	p.90	21	Martha	 Nussbaum,	 ‘Aristotle,	 Politics	 and	 Human	 Capabilities:	 A	 Response	 to	 Antony,	 Arneson,	Charlesworth,	and	Mulgan’,	Ethics	111	(2000):	102-140,	p.124	22	Nussbaum,	Creating	Capabilities,	p.28	
		 6	
pursue	their	own	conceptions	of	value”23.	Nonetheless,	she	retains	a	commitment	to	the	value	of	certain	functionings,	which	she	considers	“of	central	importance	in	any	human	 life,	 whatever	 else	 the	 person	 pursues	 or	 chooses”24 .	 This	 may	 seem	insignificant,	 as	 long	 as	 she	promotes	 the	capability	 to	perform	 these	 functionings,	rather	 than	 the	 functionings	 themselves.	 Yet	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 conceptualising	capabilities	 as	 the	 ability	 to	 achieve	 certain	 valuable	 functionings	 will	 prove	problematic,	 and	 threaten	 the	 neutrality	 and	 inclusivity	 of	 her	 approach.	 First,	though,	 I	 will	 outline	 the	 textual	 evidence	 that	 supports	 this	 (relatively	uncontroversial)	interpretation	of	capabilities	in	Nussbaum’s	approach.			Nussbaum’s	 perfectionist	 commitment	 to	 the	 value	 of	 certain	 functionings	 is	suggested	most	 clearly	 by	 her	 willingness	 to	 endorse	 paternalist	 policies	 in	 some	instances.	Whilst	perfectionism	and	paternalism	are,	of	course,	distinct,	paternalism	(as	interference	with	an	individual	for	their	own	good,	motivated	by	distrust	of	their	ability	 to	 promote	 their	 own	 interests25)	 is	 often	 grounded	 in	 a	 perfectionist	understanding	of	the	good	life,	which	paternalism	may	be	justified	to	achieve.	First,	then,	 Nussbaum	 is	 willing	 to	 sacrifice	 autonomy	 to	 ensure	 individuals	 actually	function.	She	notes	that	“[e]ven	where	adults	are	concerned,	we	may	feel	that	some	of	 the	 capabilities	 are	 so	 important…that	we	 are	 sometimes	 justified	 in	 promoting	functioning	 rather	 than	 simply	 capability” 26 .	 The	 functionings	 she	 considers	sufficiently	 important	 to	 warrant	 being	 promoted	 directly	 are	 health,	 affiliation,	dignity,	 and	practical	 reason.	 For	 example,	 she	notes	 that	 “health	 is	 a	 human	good	that	 has	 value	 in	 itself,	 independent	 of	 choice,	 and	 that	 it	 is	 not	 unreasonable	 for	government	 to	 take	 a	 stand	 on	 its	 importance	 that	 to	 some	 extent…bypasses	choice”27.	The	value	of	 this	 functioning	 is	used	 to	 justify	health	and	 safety	policies,	and	laws	prohibiting	risky	activities,	such	as	drug	use.		Second,	Nussbaum’s	concern	for	functionings	is	apparent	in	her	reluctance	to	allow	individuals	to	give	up	the	capability	to	perform	certain	functionings	in	the	future,	and	protection	of	 “crucial	 areas	of	 empowerment”,	 even	 if	 the	protected	 individuals	do	not	recognise	their	value.28	Nussbaum	expresses	concern	for	cases	in	which	“adults,	
																																																						23	Nussbaum,	Women	and	Human	Development,	p.55	24	Nussbaum,	Women	and	Human	Development,	p.74	25	For	example:	Gerald	Dworkin,	‘Defining	Paternalism’,	in:	Christian	Coons	and	Michael	Weber	(eds.),	
Paternalism:	 Theory	 and	 Practice	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 2013):	 25-38;	 Seana	Shiffrin,	 ‘	 Paternalism,	 Unconscionability	 Doctrine,	 and	Accommodation’,	Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs	29	(2000):	205-250;	Jonathan	Quong,	Liberalism	without	Perfection	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	pp.73-107.		26	Nussbaum,	Women	and	Human	Development,	p.91	27	Nussbaum,	Women	and	Human	Development,	p.91	28	Martha	Nussbaum,	‘On	Hearing	Women’s	Voices:	A	Reply	to	Susan	Okin’,	Philosophy	&	Public	Affairs	32	(2004):	193-205,	p.199	
		 7	
apparently	without	 coercion,	want	 to	 sign	away	a	major	 capability	 in	 a	permanent	way”29,	and	argues	that	we	will	‘frequently’	consider	interference	justified	to	protect	the	 capability.	 The	 practices	 she	 would	 prohibit	 on	 this	 basis	 include:	 voluntary	enslavement,	drug	use,	suicide,	and	female	genital	cutting	(FGC).	More	generally,	she	insists	 that	 “if	 there	 were	 no	 functioning	 of	 any	 kind	 in	 a	 life,	 we	 could	 hardly	applaud	 it,	 no	matter	what	 opportunities	 it	 contained”30.	 Thus,	 it	 seems	 clear	 that	both	capabilities	and	functionings	are	important.	As	Nussbaum	puts	it,	“freedom	has	intrinsic	value…[but	t]he	capabilities	would	be	pointless	and	idle	if	they	were	never	used” 31 .	 Further,	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 central	 functionings	 is	 suggested	 by	Nussbaum’s	assumption	that	people	will	come	to	value	functionings	(such	as	literacy	or	free	speech)	once	they	have	experience	of	them.32			In	response	to	all	these	points,	it	may	be	objected	that	such	examples	are	intended	as	illustrative	rather	than	definitive	of	Nussbaum’s	approach	and,	as	such,	it	is	unfair	to	focus	 criticisms	 on	 this	 element	 of	 her	work.	 Yet	 I	would	 contend,	 first,	 that	 these	policy	 recommendations	 arise	 from,	 and	 are	 consistent	 with,	 her	 more	 developed	theory,	 and	 so	 can	 legitimately	 be	 taken	 to	 be	 indicative	 of	 its	 likely	 practical	consequences.	Second,	I	would	emphasise	that	I	do	not	criticise	her	for	these	specific	policies	 (though,	 indeed,	 I	 would	 not	 endorse	 them),	 but	 for	 the	 commitments	underlying	them:	the	value	of	certain	functionings.	Even	if	Nussbaum	were	to	jettison	her	paternalist	policies,	her	approach	would	remain	perfectionist	 for	as	 long	as	the	list	 of	 central	 capabilities	 is	 taken	 to	 represent	 opportunities	 to	 perform	 those	functionings	essential	 to	a	good	 life.	Ultimately	 the	 important	point	 is	not	whether	she	 sometimes	 endorses	 forcing	 individuals	 to	 function	 or	 to	 maintain	 their	capabilities,	 but	 whether	 she	 conceptualises	 capabilities	 as	 the	 ability	 to	 perform	valuable	functionings.			Finally,	a	similar	interpretation	of	Nussbaum	is	adopted	by	other	commentators.	Ian	Carter,	 for	 example,	 presents	 three	 possible	 readings	 of	 Nussbaum,	 which	 he	considers	 paternalist	 to	 different	 degrees.	 Even	 on	 his	 third,	 least	 paternalist,	interpretation,	functionings	remain	of	central	importance:		What	matters…is	that	people	enjoy	certain	specific	capabilities,	not	that	they	 enjoy	 capability	 as	 such,	 and	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 such	 specific	
																																																						29	Nussbaum,	Women	and	Human	Development,	p.93	30	Nussbaum,	Women	and	Human	Development,	p.87	31	Nussbaum,	Creating	Capabilities,	p.25	32	For	 example:	 Nussbaum,	 ‘On	 Hearing	 Women’s	 Voices’,	 p.199;	 Nussbaum,	 Women	 and	 Human	
Development,	p.87;	pp.152-54.		
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capabilities	we	shall	still	need	to	refer	to	a	list	of	independently	specified	
functionings.33	Rutger	Claassen	and	Marcus	Düwell	have	also	raised	concerns	regarding	Nussbaum’s	“very	 expansive	 list	 of	 capabilities” 34 .	 Their	 scepticism	 concerns	 whether	 her	Aristotelian	 methodology	 justifies	 her	 normative	 conclusions,	 but	 the	 important	point	 for	my	 purposes	 is	 that	 they	 understand	 the	 capabilities	 as	 opportunities	 to	perform	the	functionings	essential	to	a	human	life.35				I	do	not	suggest	 that	Nussbaum	 is	disingenuous	about	her	concern	 for	capabilities,	nor	 that	 she	 is	 really	 concerned	 to	 promote	 functionings	 (despite	 occasional	anomalous	 policy	 proposals).	 My	 objections	 to	 her	 theory	 depend	 only	 on	 her	attaching	some	value	to	specific	 functionings,	 identifying	central	capabilities	on	the	basis	 of	 the	 value	 of	 these	 functionings,	 and	 conceptualising	 capabilities	 as	opportunities	to	perform	(or	not)	these	particular	functionings.	I	will	not	defend	this	interpretation	further	here,	but	will	now	consider	its	implications.			
3.	Inclusivity,	Universalism,	and	Choice		The	plausibility	 of	Nussbaum’s	 approach	depends	on	 individuals	 sharing	 a	 view	of	the	opportunities	necessary	for	a	dignified	human	life.	How	will	she	respond,	then,	to	cases,	 in	 which	 some	 do	 not	 choose,	 do	 not	 value,	 or	 cannot	 perform,	 a	 central	functioning?	 In	 particular,	 to	 those	who	 consider	 their	 lives	 fully	 dignified,	 though	they	lack	the	capability	to	perform	a	functioning	Nussbaum	considers	central.	In	the	face	of	such	disagreement,	one	response	is	to	remove	the	offending	capabilities	from	the	 list,	 though	 this	 may	 be	 unsatisfactory	 if	 they	 are	 essential	 to	 other	 lives.	Alternatively,	Nussbaum	may	 insist	on	 the	value	of	 the	 capability	 to	perform	 these	functionings,	despite	the	views	of	those	unable	to	do	so.	It	is	a	capability,	after	all,	so	no	 one	 will	 be	 compelled	 to	 function.	 However,	 this	 response	 will	 also	 prove	unsatisfactory.	First,	providing	the	capability	to	perform	a	specific	function	will	mean	that	 those	who	wish	 to	 perform	 other	 forms	 of	 functioning	will	 not	 be	 entitled	 to	state	 assistance.	 Second,	 the	 justification	 of	 these	 capabilities	 –	 on	 the	 basis	 of	agreement	 on	 the	 value	 of	 the	 underlying	 functioning	 –	 will	 entail	 the	 expressive	subordination	of	those	who	cannot	perform,	and	do	not	value,	this	functioning.	It	is	
																																																						33	Carter,	‘Is	the	Capability	Approach	Paternalist?’,	p.91	(latter	emphasis	mine)	34	Claassen	and	Düwell,	‘The	Foundations	of	Capability	Theory’,	p.506	35	They	propose	that	we	should,	instead,	follow	Gewirth	in	protecting	only	those	capabilities	essential	for	 ‘agency’.	 Serena	 Olsaretti	 (‘Endorsement	 and	 Freedom	 in	 Amartya	 Sen’s	 Capability	 Approach’,	
Economics	 and	 Philosophy	 21	 (2005):	 89-108,	 p.94)	 also	 assumes	 all	 capability	 approaches	 must	specify	particular	valuable	functionings.	
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for	this	reason	I	argue	capabilities	should	be	conceptualised	instead	as	the	ability	to	
control	certain	domains	of	our	life.			
3.1	Failing	to	Choose	or	Value	Functionings		Before	considering	cases	that	threaten	the	neutrality	of	Nussbaum’s	approach,	I	will	consider	those	cases	that	she	is	able	to	handle,	and	thus	also	show	how	my	approach	differs	 from	 other	 superficially	 similar	 critiques.	 First,	 then,	 are	 cases	 in	 which	individuals	 choose	 not	 to	 perform	 a	 central	 functioning,	 either	 occasionally	 (for	example,	 fasting),	 or	 more	 permanently	 (for	 example,	 celibacy).	 Nussbaum	 insists	her	approach	“says	nothing	against”	such	decisions.36	This	is	true	of	the	examples	on	which	she	 focuses	 in	which	 functionings	are	necessarily	or	 contingently	 in	conflict,	and	 someone	 chooses	 not	 to	 perform	 one	 functioning	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 another.	 For	example,	 for	 a	 celibate	monk,	 a	 failure	 to	 function	 in	 one	way	 (sexual	 satisfaction)	may	be	necessary	for	another	functioning	he	values	more	highly	(spiritual	fulfilment).	Functionings	which	 are	 not	 inherently	 incompatible	may	 also	 conflict	 in	 particular	circumstances.	For	example,	in	Scanlon’s	case	of	someone	who	prefers	help	building	a	 temple	 to	 being	 decently	 fed,	 a	 conflict	 arises	 between	 religious	 functioning	 and	nourishment.37	Nussbaum	values	both,	 and	may	consider	 it	permissible	 to	 sacrifice	one	for	the	other	in	such	circumstances	(though	she	would	insist	that	justice	requires	that	the	individual	be	enabled	to	achieve	both).			More	troubling	are	cases	 in	which	someone	chooses	to	give	up	a	central	 for	a	non-central	 functioning,	 for	 example,	 starving	 oneself	 to	meet	 some	 ideal	 of	 beauty,	 or	choosing	the	pleasures	of	drug-use	at	the	expense	of	one’s	long-term	health.	It	is	not	clear	 that	Nussbaum	would	have	 ‘nothing	to	say’	against	 these	choices	and,	as	§2.2	considered,	is	willing	to	advocate	policies	that	disincentivise,	or	even	prohibit,	such	choices.	 Yet	 these	 cases	 are	 not	 deeply	 problematic	 for	 her	 theory:	 though	 the	individuals	 prefer	 a	 non-central	 functioning,	 they	 may	 still	 value	 the	 central	functionings.	 Presumably,	 if	 nourishment	 and	 health	 could	 be	 achieved	 alongside	thinness	 and	 drug-use	 the	 above	 individuals	 would	 prefer	 this.	 Thus,	 whilst	 such	cases	 seem	 to	 goad	 Nussbaum	 into	 paternalist	 policies,	 they	 do	 not	 threaten	 the	possibility	of	an	overlapping	consensus	on	the	central	capabilities.			Other	commentators	have	argued	that	individuals	who	will	threaten	this	overlapping	consensus	 are	 those	 that	 do	 not	 value	 the	 central	 capabilities.	 Eric	 Nelson,	 for	
																																																						36	Nussbaum,	Women	and	Human	Development,	p.87	37	T.M.	Scanlon,	‘Preference	and	Urgency’,	Journal	of	Philosophy	72	(1975):	655-669,	pp.659-660	
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example,	 argues	 that	 the	 following	 cases	 would	 be	 “excluded	 from…[Nussbaum’s]	‘overlapping	consensus’”:	Suppose	I	am	a	celibate,	and	I	believe	that	sexual	satisfaction	is	sinful;	or	suppose	 I	 am	a	misanthrope	who	does	not	 see	any	value	 in	associating	with	other	human	beings;	or	suppose	I	am	one	of	those	who	thinks	that	laughter	 is	a	 cruel	expression	of	hatred	 (like	Descartes)	or	of	vainglory	(like	Hobbes);	or	suppose	I	am	a	Christian	Scientist	who	thinks	it	is	illicit	to	 employ	many	 fundamental	 techniques	of	Western	medicine	 (such	as	blood	transfusion).38		In	a	similar	vein,	Claassen	and	Düwell	give	the	example	of	a	‘Humourless	Warrior’:		Apart	from	other	normal	human	features,	two	things	are	peculiar	about	him:	he	utterly	lacks	the	capacity	for	humour...He	is	also	aggressive...[and	is]	predisposed	to	using	physical	force	against	others.39		Claassen	 and	 Düwell’s	 concern	 is	 twofold:	 Nussbaum	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 the	Warrior	does	not	get	his	capability	for	aggression	protected	and	enabled	as	a	matter	of	 justice,	 like	 the	 central	 capabilities;	 and	 nor	 does	 she	 explain	 why	 the	Warrior	must	 fund	 others’	 capabilities	 for	 humour	 and	 play,	 given	 that	 he	 considers	 these	functionings	 valueless.	 Nelson	 also	 shares	 this	 second	 concern,	 noting	 that	 even	those	 who	 consider	 sex	 to	 be	 sinful	 may	 be	 “required	 to	 fund	 somebody	 else’s	Viagra”40.			It	 should	 be	 noted	 first,	 that	 Nelson	 somewhat	 mischaracterises	 the	 nature	 of	Nussbaum’s	 overlapping	 consensus	 –	 as	 an	 agreement	 on	 what	 “we	 all	 want	 an	
entitlement	to”41.	Nussbaum,	in	fact,	seeks	agreement	on	the	functionings	essential	to	a	dignified	life.	Having	established	the	centrality	of	these	functionings	for	a	dignified	human	 life,	 she	 then	 argues	 that	 everyone	 should	be	entitled	 to	 the	opportunity	 to	perform	 them.	 A	 libertarian,	 for	 example,	 may	 agree	 that	 humans	 need	 to	 be	nourished,	and	so	can	be	part	of	the	overlapping	consensus	on	the	importance	of	this	functioning	for	a	dignified	life,	even	if	they	do	not	consider	individuals	to	be	entitled	to	the	capability	for	nourishment.	Similarly,	if	Nelson’s	Christian	Scientists	agree	on	the	importance	of	health,	the	fact	that	they	disapprove	of	blood	transfusions	would	not	lead	to	their	exclusion.			Second,	 even	 those	 who	 do	 not	 value	 a	 particular	 functioning	may	 appreciate	 its	significance	in	others’	lives.	Descartes,	Hobbes,	and	the	Humourless	Warrior	may	not	
																																																						38	Nelson,	‘From	Primary	Goods	to	Capabilities’,	p.99	39	Claassen	and	Düwell,	‘The	Foundations	of	Capability	Theory’,	pp.496-497	40	Nelson,	‘From	Primary	Goods	to	Capabilities’,	p.100	41	Nelson,	‘From	Primary	Goods	to	Capabilities’,	p.103	
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much	like	laughter,	but	may	nonetheless	be	willing	to	acknowledge	its	value	in	other	human	 lives,	 and	 so	 agree	 it	 deserves	 a	 place	 on	 the	 list	 of	 central	 capabilities	(though	they	may	never	use	it).	There	is	a	plurality	of	reasonable	conceptions	of	the	good,	 and	we	can	agree	 that	 it	 is	 important	 to	enable	others	 to	pursue	 their	 goals,	even	when	we	do	not	share	them.	If	we	accept	our	fellow	citizens	are	free	and	equal,	and	 possess	 the	 two	moral	 powers,	 we	 should	 not	 attempt	 to	 police	 the	 use	 they	make	of	 their	capabilities,	or	resent	 funding	activities	we	do	not	value	(as	§4.2	will	argue).			For	 this	 case	 to	 threaten	 Nussbaum’s	 approach,	 then,	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 say	 that	Descartes,	Hobbes,	and	the	Warrior	do	not	value	this	capability	in	their	own	life,	we	must	 also	 show	 that	 they	 do	 not	 think	 it	 could	 be	 essential	 to	 any	 reasonable	conception	 of	 the	 good.	 This	 goes	 beyond	 the	 cases	 as	 Nelson	 and	 Claassen	 and	Düwell	 describe	 them.	 However,	 let	 us	 assume	 that,	 in	 at	 least	 some	 cases,	 this	 is	psychologically	 plausible,	 and	would	not	 render	 these	 individuals	 unreasonable,	 in	Rawls’s	sense,	such	that	they	would	be	legitimately	excluded	from	a	political	liberal	overlapping	 consensus.	 If	 this	 were	 possible,	 these	 cases	 would	 threaten	 the	possibility	 of	 consensus	 on	 the	 capabilities	 as	Nussbaum	describes	 them,	 though	 I	argue	that	they	can	be	accommodated	by	my	own	approach	(§4.1).	
	
3.2	Asexuality,	ASC,	and	Exclusion		In	most	of	these	cases,	then,	Nussbaum	can	formulate	a	plausible	response.	However,	some	 individuals	 do	 not	 merely	 choose	 not	 to	 perform	 a	 functioning,	 but	 may	 be	incapable	 of	 performing	 it.	 Many	 such	 individuals	 consider	 their	 lives	 to	 be	 fully	flourishing	 nonetheless,	 and	 so	 would	 dispute	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 opportunity	 to	perform	 this	 supposedly	necessary	 functioning	on	 the	 list	 of	 central	 capabilities:	 it	cannot	be	an	essential	component	of	a	decent	human	life	if	they	can	live	one	without	it.	 I	will	 consider	 asexual	 individuals,	 and	 those	with	Autistic	 Spectrum	Conditions	(ASC),	 to	 demonstrate	 how	Nussbaum’s	 list	 of	 capabilities	 (when	conceptualised	as	
opportunities	to	function)	can	be	exclusionary.	Both,	 I	will	argue,	are	cases	in	which	an	 individual	 cannot	 perform	 a	 central	 functioning,	 and	 yet	 claim	 to	 have	 a	flourishing	life	in	their	absence.	Thus,	they	could	never	be	part	of	a	consensus	on	the	centrality	of	these	functionings.			First,	 then,	 I	will	 consider	 asexuality.	Nussbaum	 includes	 “having	opportunities	 for	sexual	satisfaction”	as	part	of	the	capability	for	bodily	integrity.42	This	implies	a	bias	
																																																						42	Nussbaum,	Women	and	Human	Development,	 p.78.	 One	 solution	 for	 Nussbaum,	 here,	might	 be	 to	remove	this	functioning	from	the	specification	of	the	capability	for	bodily	integrity.	Yet	this	would	be	
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in	 favour	 of	 active	 forms	 of	 sexual	 expression:	 sexual	 satisfaction	 is	 important	 to	human	life,	so	we	ought	to	have	the	opportunity	to	achieve	it.	Yet	asexual	individuals	lack	 all	 sexual	 desire,	 and	 so	 do	 not	 value	 sexual	 satisfaction.43	Indeed,	 in	 at	 least	some	cases,	it	seems	they	will	be	incapable	of	sexual	satisfaction.	Asexual	individuals	are,	typically,	physically	capable	of	performing	sexual	acts,	but	their	complete	lack	of	desire	 means	 they	 cannot	 be	 said	 to	 derive	 sexual	 satisfaction	 from	 them.	 This	functioning	 requires	 both	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 act	 and	 that	 it	 is	 chosen	 for	 the	right	 reasons	 (because	we	 desire	 sexual	 satisfaction):	 it	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 the	functioning	is	valuable,	and	could	be	the	subject	of	an	overlapping	consensus.	Thus,	though	 an	 asexual	 individual	 may	 choose	 (voluntarily)	 to	 perform	 a	 sex	 act	 to	achieve	 some	 other	 end,	 such	 as	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 another’s	 sexual	 or	 emotional	needs,	 they	 cannot	 choose	 to	 perform	 the	 functioning,	 since	 they	 have	 failed	 to	achieve	what	is	uniquely	valuable	about	it	–	a	satisfying	sexual	experience.			Second,	 some	 individuals	with	ASC	 are	 seemingly	 unable	 to	 perform	at	 least	 some	elements	of	the	supposedly	central	functionings	of	affiliation,	and	forming	emotional	attachments.	 Consider	 Nussbaum’s	 description	 of	 the	 former	 capability,	 which	requires	 being	 able	 “to	 recognise	 and	 show	 concern	 for	 other	 human	 beings,	 to	engage	 in	various	 forms	of	social	 interaction;	 to	be	able	 to	 imagine	 the	situation	of	another”44.	This	seems	 incompatible	with	the	experiences	of	many	 individuals	with	ASC,	who	have	difficulty	with	social	 interaction,	communication,	and	expressions	of	empathy.	 Yet,	 as	 the	 thriving	 ‘neurodiversity’	 movement	 make	 clear,	 many	individuals	with	ASC	do	not	consider	themselves	worse	off	as	a	result:	“They	do	not	want	to	be	cured.	They	want	to	be	understood”45.	Similarly,	asexual	 individuals	are	rightly	 offended	 by	 those	 who	 consider	 their	 sexual	 orientation	 a	 pathology	 that	requires	therapy	or	hormone	treatment	to	‘fix’	 it.	As	one	asexual	person	comments,	“there’s	nothing	to	fix	because	we’re	not	broken”46.		If	 Nussbaum	 relies	 on	 an	 overlapping	 consensus	 to	 identify	 her	 list	 of	 central	capabilities,	 then	 deep	 disagreement	 on	 the	 centrality	 of	 one	 of	 them	 raises	 a	dilemma:	 either	 she	must	 remove	 the	 capability	 for	 the	 disputed	 functioning	 from	
																																																																																																																																																																		unsatisfactory	since	it	is	central	to	many	human	lives,	and	in	those	cases	should	be	enabled	as	a	matter	of	justice.	43 	See,	 for	 example,	 AVEN	 (Asexuality	 Visibility	 and	 Education	 Network)	 (www.asexuality.org);	
Asexuality	Archive	(www.asexualityarchive.com).	44	Nussbaum,	Creating	Capabilities,	p.34	45	Mike	Stanton,	‘What	is	Neurodiversity?’,	Action	for	Autism	(2006).	Available	at:	http://mikestanton.wordpress.com/my-autism-pages/what-is-neurodiversity/.	 Accessed:	 17	 July	2014	46	Anon.,	 ‘Asexuality:	Myths,	Misconceptions	and	Other	Things	That	Are	Just	Plain	Wrong’,	Asexuality	
Archive	 (2012).	 Available	 at:	 http://www.asexualityarchive.com/asexuality-misconceptions-and-mistakes/.	Accessed:	18	July	2014	
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her	 list,	 or	 remove	 the	 dissenting	 individuals	 from	 the	 group	 who	 forms	 the	overlapping	 consensus.	 Nussbaum	 does	 not	 claim	 that	 her	 list	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 a	current	 consensus,	 but	 that	 it	 can	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 a	 potential	 future	 one,	 once	individuals	 have	 experienced	 the	 functionings	 she	 considers	 central.47	Thus,	 the	point	 is	 not	 that	 some	 people	 currently	 dispute	 her	 list	 (she	may,	 perhaps,	 brush	aside	 the	 celibate,	 the	misanthrope,	 and	 the	warrior	 on	 this	 basis),	 but	 that	 for	 as	long	 as	 people	 are	 asexual,	 or	 have	 ASC,	 and	 see	 their	 condition	 as	 part	 of	 a	flourishing	life	rather	than	an	obstacle	to	one,	then	there	can	never	be	a	consensus	on	her	list.	We	are	not	asking	individuals	to	agree	that	activities	that	they	do	not	much	value	or	enjoy	are	essential	to	others’	reasonable	conceptions	of	the	good.	Rather,	we	are	asking	individuals	to	agree	that	the	ability	to	perform	a	functioning	of	which	they	are	incapable	is	essential	to	any	dignified	life.			My	concern,	here,	is	not	that	of	Arneson	who	argues	that	“[i]f	one’s	ultimate	ethical	concern	 is	 the	quality	of	 lives	 that	people	 lead,	 then	capability	provision	 that	 in	no	way	enhances	anyone’s	 life	 is	pointless”48.	He	continues:	 “[j]ustice	according	 to	 the	capability	 approach	 obligates	 society	 to	 ‘help’	 [people]	 in	 ways	 that	 do	 [them]	 no	good	by	[their]	own	lights”49.	The	‘ultimate	ethical	concern’	of	capability	theorists	is	
not	straightforwardly	individual	quality	of	life:	if	it	were,	they	would	be	welfarists.50	Rather	(on	Nussbaum’s	version	at	 least)	 the	goal	 is	 to	ensure	 that	 individuals	have	the	 substantive	opportunity	 to	perform	 those	 functionings	necessary	 to	a	dignified	human	 life.	 Not	 all	 individuals	 will	 value	 these	 opportunities,	 and	 having	 these	opportunities	 will	 not	 necessarily	 increase	 their	 welfare,	 but	 capability	 theorists	would	 argue	 that	 they	 are	 entitled	 to	 them	 nonetheless.	 For	 example,	 capability	theorists	would	 consider	 it	 unjust	 to	 deny	 someone	 the	 capability	 to	 vote,	 even	 if	they	do	not	value,	or	wish	to	exercise,	it.			Yet	 in	 the	 case	 of	 asexual	 and	 autistic	 individuals,	 the	 capabilities	 do	 not	 just	 ‘do	them	no	good’.	It	is	central	to	the	concept	of	capabilities	that	they	are	not	merely	the	absence	 of	 interference,	 but	 provide	 individuals	 with	 ‘real’	 or	 ‘substantial’	
																																																						47	“[T]he	 preference	 for	 the	 central	 human	 capabilities	 is	 not	 merely	 habitual	 or	 adaptive,	 but	 has	much	more	the	unidirectional	structure	of	preferences	formed	by	learning”	(Nussbaum	2000a,	152).		48	Arneson,	‘Perfectionism	and	Politics’,	p.60	49	Arneson,	‘Perfectionism	and	Politics’,	p.61	50	It	 might	 be	 objected	 here	 that	 on	 some	 versions	 of	 the	 capability	 approach	 (notably	 Sen’s)	 the	ultimate	 concern	 is	 quality	 of	 life.	 However,	 this	 is	 not	Nussbaum’s	 focus,	 and	 nor	 should	 it	 be	 the	focus	of	any	capability	theorist	who	wishes	their	approach	to	remain	distinct	from	welfarism	(and,	as	I	have	 argued	 elsewhere,	 the	 capability	 approach	 to	 distributive	 justice	 need	 not	 and	 should	 not	collapse	into	welfarism	(Jessica	Begon,	‘Athletic	Policy,	Passive	Well-Being:	Defending	Freedom	in	the	Capability	Approach’,	Economics	and	Philosophy	32	(2016):	51-73)).		
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freedoms,51	and	 we	 cannot	 be	 provided	 with	 the	 substantive	 opportunity	 to	 do	something	 of	 which	 we	 are	 incapable.	 A	 celibate	 monk	 can	 be	 provided	 with	 the	opportunity	for	sexual	satisfaction	–	no	laws	or	social	stigma	prevent	his	performing	this	 functioning,	 and	 he	 understands	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 opportunity	 –	 though	 he	chooses	not	to	exercise	it	(and,	for	him,	this	choice	is	valuable	and	significant).	Yet	as	long	 as	 an	 individual	 is	 asexual,	 they	 cannot	 achieve	 the	 functioning	 of	 sexual	satisfaction,	and	so	cannot	have	this	capability.	The	same	point	applies	to	those	with	ASC	who	may	struggle	 to	 form	emotional	attachments,	engage	 in	social	 interaction,	or	imagine	the	situation	of	another.	Why	should	it	be	a	requirement	of	justice,	and	a	necessary	constituent	of	dignity,	that	we	have	an	opportunity	for	a	functioning	that	is	unachievable?		
3.3	Cures,	Justification,	and	Neutrality		One	response	may	be	that	such	individuals	can	be	provided	with	these	capabilities	if	we	were	 to	make	 ‘cures’	 available.	Whilst	 these	 are	 not	 always	 possible,	we	 could	imagine	a	situation	in	which	there	were	treatments	available	such	that	asexual	and	autistic	 individuals	 could	 be	 enabled	 to	 have	 the	 full	 range	 of	 functionings.	 If	 such	cures	 existed	 then	we	may	 think	 these	 individuals	 can	possess	 the	 capability:	 they	are	 able	 to	 function	 if	 they	 choose	 to	 undergo	 the	 cure.	 Indeed,	 Nussbaum’s	discussion	 of	 disability	 in	 Frontiers	 of	 Justice	 suggests	 she	 may	 endorse	 such	 a	response.	She	is	rightly	critical	of	the	role	that	social	 institutions	and	biases	play	in	causing	 various	 impairments	 to	be	disabling,	 and	 insists	 that	nearly	 all	 individuals	can	 perform	 the	 central	 functionings	 “if	 only	 public	 spaces	 could	 be	 adequately	designed	 to	 support	 them”52.	 However,	when	 institutional	 change	 is	 insufficient	 to	provide	 individuals	 with	 the	 capabilities,	 she	 argues	 “we	 could	 cure	 [a]	condition...because	 it	 is	 good,	 indeed	 important,	 for	 a	 human	 being	 to	 be	 able	 to	function	in	these	ways”53.			The	problem	with	this	approach	 is	not	 that	 treatments	are	offered,	but	the	basis	of	their	 justification.	Many	 autistic	 and	 asexual	 individuals	would	 find	 the	 suggestion	
																																																						51	For	 example:	 Nussbaum,	 Creating	 Capabilities,	 p.21;	 Amartya	 Sen,	 The	 Idea	 of	 Justice	 (London:	Penguin,	2009),	p.231;	Ingrid	Robeyns,	‘The	Capability	Approach’,	in:	Edward	Zalta	(ed.),	The	Stanford	
Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(2011).	Available	at:		http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/capability-approach/.	 Accessed:	 21	 August	2014).		52	Martha	Nussbaum,	Frontiers	of	Justice.	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2006),	p.189	53	Nussbaum,	 Frontiers	 of	 Justice,	 p.193.	 Nussbaum	 is	 discussing,	 here,	 Eva	 Kittay’s	 daughter	 Sesha,	who	 is	 “‘severely-profoundly’	 mentally	 retarded”	 (Eva	 Feder	 Kittay,	 ‘At	 the	 Margins	 of	 Moral	Personhood’,	Ethics	116	(2005):	100-131,	p.127).	She	remains	undecided	on	whether	the	view	would	also	 entail	 “engineering	 away”	 Down’s	 syndrome,	 or	 Asperger’s,	 or	 blindness	 and	 deafness,	 and	refuses	to	“speak	clearly	against”	this	possibility	(Nussbaum,	Frontiers	of	Justice,	p.193).		
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that	 their	 life	 is	 lacking	 something	 ‘good	 and	 important’,	 and	 that	 a	 cure	 is	 an	appropriate	 response	 to	 their	 condition,	 deeply	 offensive.	 However,	 many	 others	may	welcome	such	a	cure.	Given	this	heterogeneity	it	may	seem	that	making	a	cure	available,	but	not	 forcing	anyone	to	undergo	 it,	 is	 the	right	approach:	everyone	has	the	 capability	 to	 function,	 and	 they	 can	 choose	whether	 they	make	 use	 of	 it.	 Yet	 a	problem	arises	if	the	justification	for	the	provision	is	that	performing	the	functioning	is	good	and	important,	and,	indeed,	necessary	to	a	dignified	life.	The	fact	that	people	are	 allowed	 to	 live	 an	 undignified	 life	 does	 not	 side-step	 the	 insult.	 The	 objection,	then,	 is	 not	 that	 a	 cure	 is	 offered,	 but	 that	 a	 cure	 is	 thought	necessary:	 individuals	need	the	opportunity	to	be	rid	of	their	condition	in	order	to	lead	a	dignified	human	life.54		It	 seems	 Nussbaum	 herself	 would	 object	 to	 such	 justifications,	 which,	 in	 her	terminology,	 would	 constitute	 ‘expressive	 subordination’:	 “subordination	 that	consists	 in	 being	 publically	 ranked	 beneath	 others”55.	 Consider,	 for	 example,	 two	justifications	 that	 we	 could	 offer	 to	 a	 reasonable	 atheist	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 the	capability	for	religious	expression.	One	states	that	engaging	in	religious	expression	is	a	 good	 and	 important	 human	 functioning,	 and	 the	 opportunity	 to	 engage	 in	 this	functioning	is	essential	to	a	dignified	human	life.	The	second	acknowledges	that	this	is	 a	 functioning	 that	 forms	 part	 of	 some	 reasonable	 conceptions	 of	 the	 good,	 and	consequently	 that	 the	opportunity	 to	engage	 in	 it	 is	one	 that	 individuals	 should	be	entitled	to.	Here,	though,	the	opportunity	is	not	justified	on	the	basis	of	the	universal	value	of	the	functioning.			If	 capabilities	 are	 understood	 as	 opportunities	 to	 perform	 particular	 valuable	functionings,	 then	the	former	justification	is	offered.	The	latter	 justification	is	more	compatible	with	liberal	neutrality,	since	it	avoids	grounding	its	justification	for	cures	and	 treatments	 in	 the	 importance	 of	 particular	 functionings,	 and	 will	 be	 offered	when	capabilities	are	understood	as	domains	of	control,	as	I	suggest	they	should	be.	We	 may	 value	 such	 control,	 even	 if	 we	 do	 not	 value	 a	 particular	 functioning:	 for	example,	the	ability	of	an	asexual	person	to	choose	not	to	enter	a	sexual	relationship	
																																																						54	The	 idea	 that	 such	 functionings	are	essential	 to	a	human	 life,	and	 that	 those	who	cannot	perform	them	are	consequently	 less	than	human	is,	sadly,	not	uncommon.	For	example,	a	survey	of	attitudes	towards	asexuality	concluded	that	“sexual	desire	is	considered	a	key	component	of	human	nature	and	those	 lacking	 it	are	viewed	as	relatively	deficient,	 less	human	and	disliked”	(Hodson	and	McInnis	 in	Dominique	Mosbergen,	 ‘Battling	Asexual	Discrimination,	 Sexual	Violence	and	 ‘Corrective’	Rape’,	The	
Huffington	 Post.	 Available	 at:	 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/20/asexual-discrimination_n_3380551.html?1371733068.	 Accessed:	 22	 July	 2014).	 Further,	 as	 one	 asexual	person	 notes,	 “[w]e	 are	 perceived	 as	 not	 being	 fully	 human	 because	 sexual	 attraction	 and	 sexual	relationships	are	seen	as	something	alive,	healthy	people	do”	(Decker	in	Mosbergen,	‘Battling	Asexual	Discrimination’).		55	Nussbaum,	‘Perfectionist	Liberalism	and	Political	Liberalism’,	p.35	
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may	be	essential	to	their	flourishing,	though	the	functioning	of	sexual	satisfaction	is	not.	 Further,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 this	 approach	 is	 better	 able	 to	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 an	overlapping	 consensus	 amongst	 those	 who	 cannot	 perform,	 or	 do	 not	 value,	supposedly	central	 functionings,	and	provides	a	wider	range	of	opportunities,	 such	that	all	individuals	are	given	opportunities	they	can	reasonably	possess	and	value.			
4.	Modifying	the	Capability	Approach		In	 providing	 this	modification	 of	 Nussbaum’s	 approach,	 I	 aim	 to	 demonstrate	 that	developing	 a	 theory	 of	 distributive	 justice	 that	 is	 inclusive	 of	 individuals	 with	atypical	 preferences,	 needs,	 or	 values	 will	 not	 require	 either	 culling	 the	 list	 of	capabilities,	 or	 abandoning	 the	 capability	 approach	 in	 favour	 of	 resourcism	 or	welfarism.	Rather,	we	should	simply	change	how	capabilities	are	conceptualised:	not	as	 opportunities	 to	 perform	 specific	 valuable	 functionings,	 but	 as	 opportunities	 to	exercise	 control	 over	 certain	 central	 domains	 of	 our	 life.	 I	 will	 conclude	 by	considering	some	potential	objections	to	this	approach.		
4.1	Capabilities	to	Control		Given	 that	 my	 focus	 is	 on	 how	 capabilities	 should	 be	 conceptualised,	 I	 will	 not	critique	 the	 basic	 methodology	 of	 identifying	 the	 central	 features	 of	 a	 dignified	human	 life	 through	 internal	 consideration	 and	 interpersonal	discussion,	which	 can	result	 in	 an	 overlapping	 consensus	 amongst	 individuals	 with	 otherwise	 diverse	conceptions	 of	 the	 good.	 What	 I	 question	 is	 what	 it	 is	 we	 should	 to	 come	 to	 a	consensus	 on.	 We	 should	 not	 ask	 ‘which	 functionings	 are	 essential	 to	 a	 dignified	human	life?’,	but	‘which	domains	ought	people	have	control	over	if	they	are	to	lead	a	dignified	human	 life?’.	 In	other	words,	rather	 than	providing	specific	opportunities,	we	 enable	 individuals	 to	 form	 and	 pursue	 their	 own	 conception	 of	 the	 good	 in	specific	parts	of	their	lives.			What	 difference	 would	 this	 change	 in	 the	 overlapping	 consensus	 make?	 It	 would	mean	 that	 our	 reason	 to	 include	 capabilities	 –	 for	 example,	 ‘the	 opportunity	 to	 be	nourished’	 –	 would	 not	 be	 due	 to	 agreement	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 functioning	(being	nourished)	but	due	to	the	importance	of	this	domain	(choosing	how,	or	if,	we	are	 nourished).	 This	will	make	 the	 overlapping	 consensus	more	 inclusive	 of	 those	with	 different	 conceptions	 of	 the	 good,	 as	 well	 as	 altering	 the	 structure	 of	 the	resulting	capabilities.	Capabilities	would	no	longer	be	the	chance	to	perform	(or	not)	a	particular	functioning,	but	the	substantive	opportunity	to	function	in	whatever	way	we	 choose,	 in	 a	 domain	we	have	 agreed	 to	 be	 important.	 The	 capability	 for	 bodily	
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health,	for	example,	will	not	be	the	opportunity	to	achieve	a	predefined	conception	of	bodily	health,	or	to	choose	not	to	achieve	 it.	 It	would	be	the	opportunity	to	control	our	 bodily	 health,	 and	 have	 the	 substantive	 power	 to	 determine	 and	 achieve	 the	functionings	we	prefer	(even	if	they	are	not	widely	considered	‘healthy’).			By	asking	 individuals	 to	agree	on	central	domains	of	control,	 then,	we	can	derive	a	specific	list	of	capabilities	without	a	specific	conception	of	a	flourishing	life.	As	well	as	avoiding	the	insulting	justifications	for	capability	provision	discussed	above,	this	approach	is	better	able	to	include	individuals	who	do	not	value	central	functionings	in	the	overlapping	consensus,	and	enables	them	to	function	in	non-standard	ways.		First,	 individuals	with	different	preferences	can	agree	on	the	value	of	having	choice	and	control,	without	needing	to	agree	on	what	 it	 is	best	to	choose.	For	example,	by	focussing	 on	 ‘control	 of,	 or	 choice	 in,	 matters	 of	 sexual	 expression’	 –	 rather	 than	Nussbaum’s	 ‘opportunities	 for	sexual	satisfaction’	–	a	religious	conservative,	a	 free-love	hippy,	and	even	Nelson’s	celibate,	could	all	agree	that	this	is	important.	This	is	true,	too,	of	Hobbes,	Descartes,	and	the	Humourless	Warrior,	discussed	in	§3.1,	who	do	 not	 see	 any	 value	 in	 the	 capacity	 for	 laughter	 and	 play,	 but	 can	 agree	 on	 the	importance	of	controlling	this	part	of	our	life.	In	all	such	cases,	these	groups	would,	of	course,	have	radically	different	views	about	the	proper	use	that	should	be	made	of	such	control	but	 they	can,	nonetheless,	 accept	 the	 central	value	of	 setting	our	own	ends	in	these	domains	of	our	life.56				More	 importantly,	 even	 those	 who	 cannot	 have	 a	 capability	 of	 Nussbaum’s	 sort	 –	because	 they	cannot	perform	a	 functioning	–	may	possess,	 and	value,	 such	control.	For	example,	asexual	individuals	cannot	possess	the	capability	for	sexual	satisfaction	(as	long	as	they	are	asexual),	and	may	resent	the	offer	of	therapies	designed	to	allow	this	experience.	They	can,	however,	exercise,	and	value,	the	capability	to	control	their	sexuality	 and	 sexual	 life:	 this	 is	 exactly	 what	 asexuality	 advocacy	 groups,	 such	 as	AVEN,	campaign	for.	This	may,	for	example,	involve	education	programmes	to	allow	for	the	wider	recognition	of	asexuality	as	a	sexual	orientation.	Similarly,	individuals	with	ASC,	who	cannot	form	emotional	attachments	or	engage	in	social	interactions	in	the	 way	 that	 Nussbaum	 describes,	 can	 still	 value	 having	 control	 over	 this	 area	 of	their	life.	Indeed,	the	existence	of	the	neurodiversity	movement	suggests	that	many	with	ASC	do	strongly	value	such	control,	and	wish	to	have	their	needs	in	this	domain	accommodated,	rather	than	being	enabled	to	function	in	a	neurotypical	way.		
																																																						56	Inclusion	of	 such	 individuals	would	not	 have	 a	 repressive	 effect:	 individuals	 cannot	 enforce	 their	view	of	what	is	‘right’,	since	they	would	be	asked	only	what	individuals	should	control	(assuming	the	importance	of	autonomy	(§4.2))	and	not	the	proper	use	that	should	be	made	of	this	control.	
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	Yet	it	might	be	objected	that	even	if	a	range	of	options	is	provided,	the	definition	of	domains	 of	 control,	 and	 the	 justification	 of	 their	 inclusion	 in	 the	 list	 of	 central	capabilities,	 must	 still	 involve	 some	 reference	 to	 functionings,	 and	 thus	 leave	 the	approach	vulnerable	to	the	criticisms	I	raise	for	Nussbaum.	It	is	true	that	we	can	only	pick	out	the	important	domains	of	control	by	reference	to	the	valuable	functionings	that	 individuals	 may	 pursue	 in	 this	 domain.	 For	 example,	 control	 over	 sexual	expression	 matters	 because	 the	 various	 functionings	 achievements	 that	 this	expression	 could	 entail	 matter.	 However,	 the	 domains	 do	 not	 need	 to	 be	 defined	simply	as	a	list	of	functionings,	which	have	been	predetermined	to	be	important.	Just	as	 Nussbaum	 emphasises	 that	 the	 list	 of	 capabilities	 is	 “open-ended	 and	 humble”,	and	 open	 to	 revision,57	so	 the	 same	 can	 be	 said	 of	 the	 contents	 of	 the	 domains	 of	control.	What	these	domains	entail	should	be	determined	in	consultation	with	those	with	a	variety	of	experiences,	preferences,	needs,	and	abilities,	and	should	be	revised	as	necessary	to	 include	 further	 functioning	experiences	within	the	domain	that	can	be	shown	to	be	valuable.	Further,	 the	very	 inclusion	of	a	multiplicity	of	 functioning	achievements	 within	 the	 domain	 avoids	 the	 central,	 and	 problematic,	 assumption	underlying	capabilities	to	function:	that	specific	functionings	are	taken	to	be	valuable,	or	even	necessary,	to	any	human	life.			An	 example	may	 illustrate	 this	 point.	 Consider	 deaf	 and/or	 blind	 individuals,	who	arguably	lack	Nussbaum’s	capability	to	‘use	the	senses’,	since	they	cannot	achieve	the	functioning	 of	 hearing	 and/or	 sight.58	These	 individuals	 can,	 nonetheless,	 possess	and	 value	 control	 over	 their	 sensory	 experience,	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 achieve	 other	sensory	 functionings	 (some	 of	 which	 may	 be	 shared	 by	 hearing	 and	 sighted	individuals,	and	some	which	may	not).	Allowing	for	a	range	of	goals	 in	this	domain	would	mean	that	we	would	not	just	focus	on,	for	example,	the	provision	of	cochlear	implants,	and	so	making	available	the	ability	to	perform	the	functioning	identified	as	valuable	(hearing).	Instead,	individuals	would	be	entitled	to	the	resources	they	need	to	 have	 the	 sensory	 experience	 they	 want,	 as	 well	 as	 control	 over	 their	 ability	 to	function	 in	 other	 domains,	 which	 may	 be	 restricted	 if	 accommodation	 for	 their	impairment	is	limited.	For	example,	education	in	an	appropriate	medium,	translators	and	guides,	Braille	books	and	keyboards,	audible	and	visible	traffic	signals,	and	so	on.	There	 need	 be	 no	 suggestion	 that	 the	 ability	 and	 opportunity	 to	 perform	 specific	functionings	(hearing,	seeing),	and	only	these	functionings,	are	important	or	essential	to	a	decent	life.		
																																																						57	Nussbaum,	Women	and	Human	Development,	p.77.		58	For	 further	 discussion	 of	 this	 case	 see	 Elizabeth	 Barnes,	 ‘Disability	 and	 Adaptive	 Preference’,	
Philosophical	Perspectives	23	(2009):	1-22;	Jessica	Begon,	 ‘What	are	Adaptive	Preferences?	Exclusion	and	Disability	in	the	Capability	Approach’,	Journal	of	Applied	Philosophy	32	(2015):	241-257.		
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	A	further	worry,	here,	might	be	that	control	seems	to	require	that	individuals	have	a	range	 of	 options	 to	 choose	 from,	 and	 that	 in	 at	 least	 some	 of	 the	 above	 cases	individuals’	 impairments	 may	 seem	 to	 restrict	 their	 option	 sets.	 In	 response,	 it	should	 be	 emphasised	 that	 few	 impairments	 leave	 individuals	 with	 only	 one	functioning	 option	 in	 a	 domain.	 Whilst	 it	 is	 true	 that	 asexual	 individuals	 cannot	achieve	sexual	satisfaction,	this	does	not	imply	that	there	is	only	one	form	of	sexual	expression	open	to	them.	Indeed,	 the	asexual	community	 is	a	diverse	one,	 in	which	some	 choose	 to	 engage	 in	 various	 forms	 of	 sexual	 relationships	 (although	 they	themselves	 cannot	 experience	 sexual	 desire	 or	 satisfaction),	 some	 engage	 in	romantic	 but	 non-sexual	 relationships	 (and	may	 identify	 as	 hetero-,	 homo-,	 or	 bi-romantic),	 and	 some	 engage	 in	 neither	 sexual	 nor	 romantic	 relationships.	 The	diversity	of	potential	functioning	achievements	is	even	more	apparent	amongst	ASC	individuals,	as	their	very	emphasis	on	neurodiversity	makes	clear.	Further,	it	is	worth	noting	that	all	 individuals	will	be	unable	to	perform	some	functionings,	and	so	lack	certain	 experiences:	 non-asexual	 individuals	 do	 not	 know	 what	 it	 is	 like	 to	 live	without	sexual	desire,	neurotypical	individuals	have	not	experienced	living	with	ASC.		Thus,	 individuals	who	 are	 unable	 to	 exercise	 the	 central	 functionings,	 and	 instead	pursue	 non-standard	 functioning	 achievements,	 will	 still	 have	 a	 range	 of	 options	available	 to	 them.	They	 are	 able	 to	 form	 their	 own	 conception	 of	what	 constitutes	valuable	functioning	within	a	domain,	and	choose	to	pursue	this.	In	none	of	the	cases	I	discuss,	 then,	do	we	have	reason	to	 think	 that	 individuals	are	rendered	unable	 to	exercise	control	over	a	central	part	of	their	life	simply	because	they	cannot	perform,	or	do	not	value,	one	of	Nussbaum’s	central	functionings.59			There	are,	then,	two	benefits	to	my	version	of	the	capability	approach,	which	should	be	distinguished.	First,	 it	allows	 individuals	 to	be	 included	 in	 the	consensus	on	 the	central	 capabilities	without	 having	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 value	 of	 a	 functioning	 they	cannot	perform,	and	which	they	lead	a	dignified	life	without.	This	means	that	when	cures	 and	 treatments	 are	 offered	 they	 are	 not	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	 are	necessary	because	a	life	lacks	something	‘good	and	important’	unless	we	can	perform	this	 functioning.60	Rather,	 they	 are	 offered	 because	 the	 functioning	 is	 one	 valuable	
																																																						59	It	may,	of	 course,	be	possible	 to	artificially	 limit	 someone’s	 choices,	 such	 that	 they	only	have	one	option	in	a	domain	but,	as	I	have	argued	elsewhere	(Begon,	‘Athletic	Policy,	Passive	Well-Being),	this	is	impermissible.	60	It	is	preferable	to	refer	to	‘treatments’	rather	than	‘cures’	(contra	Nussbaum	(fn.53))	to	encapsulate	the	fact	that	a	treatment	need	not	eliminate	an	impairment,	and	to	avoid	the	insulting	implication	that	an	individual	would	be	objectively	better-off	if	they	chose	this	option.		
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option	amongst	many,	 that	may	be	essential	 to	some	 reasonable	conceptions	of	 the	good.			This	 then	 leads	 to	 the	 second	 benefit:	 those	 with	 non-standard	 preferences	 and	functioning	capabilities	are	not	simply	provided	with	the	opportunity	to	be	‘normal’	–	 the	 capability	 to	 perform	 the	 functioning	 deemed	 valuable.	 Instead,	 they	 are	provided	with	 the	 less	 specific	 freedom	 to	determine,	 and	pursue,	 their	 own	 goals	within	a	specific	domain.	This	may	include	the	availability	of	treatments,	but	this	is	not	 all	 that	 would	 be	 offered	 (as	 the	 above	 examples	 demonstrate).	 Providing	individuals	with	control,	without	predetermining	the	proper	use	they	should	make	of	this	control,	better	captures	the	capability	approach’s	central	concern	to	ensure	that	everyone	has	space	to	form	and	pursue	their	own	conception	of	the	good.	If	we	are	to	respect	autonomy,	and	treat	individuals	as	the	origin	of	ends,	we	must	allow	them	to	
control	their	bodily	health,	their	sexual	satisfaction,	their	emotional	attachments,	and	so	on,	and	to	choose	the	ends	that	they	wish	to	pursue	in	these	domains.			Whilst	 I	have	 focussed	on	arguing	 that	providing	 individuals	with	such	capabilities	for	 control	 constitutes	 an	 improvement	 on	 existing	 versions	 of	 the	 capability	approach,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	same	may	also	be	true	of	resourcist	or	primary	goods	 approaches.61	Valuable	 resources	 or	 primary	 goods	 are	usually	 identified	 on	the	basis	of	particular	valuable	functionings	they	enable.	Indeed,	it	is	unclear	how	we	could	 determine	 the	 value	 of	 resources	 but	 by	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 allow	individuals	 to	promote	their	ends.	Resourcists,	 then,	 tend	to	determine	 individuals’	distributive	entitlements	on	the	basis	of	what	they	need	in	order	to	have	the	“ability	to	promote	typical	or	standard	human	ends”62.			Thus,	just	as	standard	versions	of	the	capability	approach	only	enable	individuals	to	perform	 specific	 valuable	 functionings,	 so	 primary	 goods	 approaches	 only	 enable	individuals	 to	 perform	 specific	 valuable	 ends.	 As	 such,	 it	will	 exclude	 those	whose	ends	are	atypical.	Indeed,	resourcism	may	seem	even	more	vulnerable	to	objections	deriving	 from	 human	 diversity	 when	 we	 consider	 the	 oft-rehearsed	 worry	 that	 it	focuses	on	‘means’	rather	than	‘ends’,	and	so	fails	to	take	into	account	differences	in	individuals’	 conversion	capacities	 (ability	 to	convert	 resources	 into	 functionings).63	
																																																						61	I	will	not	enter	into	the	details	of	the	resourcism/capability	approach	debate	here.	For	an	overview,	see	 Harry	 Brighouse	 and	 Ingrid	 Robeyns	 (eds.),	Measuring	 Justice:	 Primary	 Goods	 and	 Capabilities.	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010).		62	Thomas	Pogge,	‘Can	the	Capability	Approach	Be	Justified?’,	Philosophical	Topics	30	(2002),	p.34.		63	For	example,	Elizabeth	Anderson,	‘Justifying	the	Capabilities	Approach	to	Justice’,	in:	Brighouse	and	Robeyns	(eds.),	Measuring	Justice:	81-100;	Amartya	Sen,	‘Justice:	Means	versus	Freedoms’,	Philosophy	
&	 Public	 Affairs	 19	 (1990):	 111-121;	 Amartya	 Sen,	 Development	 as	 Freedom,	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	University	Press,	1999),	pp.35-53.			
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This	means,	both,	that	individuals	are	only	entitled	to	the	resources	needed	to	pursue	standard	ends,	and	that	they	are	only	entitled	to	the	amount	of	resources	standardly	needed	to	achieve	these	ends;	and	thus	excludes	both	those	with	non-standard	ends,	and	those	who	need	more	resources	than	the	standard	to	pursue	their	goals.		In	response,	it	might	be	suggested	that	resources	are,	in	fact,	much	better	placed	to	allow	 individuals	 to	 pursue	 whichever	 ends	 they	 choose	 than	 capabilities.	 For	example,	 Ian	 Carter	 has	 argued	 that	 to	 treat	 a	 person	 as	 an	 end-in-themselves	we	must	value	 their	 freedom	non-specifically,	 in	 the	sense	 that	an	 individual’s	 freedom	should	 not	 depend	 on	 the	 content	 of	 their	 choice.64	Liberal	 neutrality,	 he	 argues,	would	be	best	achieved	if	individuals	were,	as	far	as	possible,	given	resources	(cash)	to	 pursue	 whichever	 capability	 they	 wish,	 rather	 than	 a	 specific	 capability	 (for	example,	 via	 an	 operation	 to	 enable	 basic	 mobility).65 	He	 calls	 this	 promoting	‘capability	as	such’.			However,	 it	 is	 central	 to	 the	 capability	 approach	 that	 individuals	 are	 entitled	 to	specific	capabilities	(however	identified),	and	not	 ‘as	many	capabilities	as	possible’,	or	‘whichever	capabilities	they	would	prefer’.	I	agree	with	Carter	that	more	emphasis	should	 be	 placed	 on	 “freedoms-to-dysfunction”66	(though	 such	 normatively-loaded	language	 is	problematic),	but	 this	 is	not	 the	same	as	 ‘freedoms-to-do-anything’.	We	should,	then,	be	offered	various	healthcare	options	(not	just	an	operation	that	allows	us	to	function	‘properly’),	but	this	need	not	mean	that	we	are	entitled	to	equivalent	cash	with	which	to	buy	a	Stradivarius	or	go	to	the	Fun	House.67	It	 is	for	this	reason	that	 I	 argue	 that	our	 focus	 should	be	on	 control	 in	 central	domains,	 as	opposed	 to	merely	 capability	 or	 autonomy	 ‘as	 such’.	 Yet,	 I	 have	 argued,	 this	 restriction	 of	 the	domains	 in	which	government	assistance	 is	warranted	need	not	exclude	those	who	pursue	 atypical	 ends	 or	 value	 non-standard	 functionings.	 A	 focus	 on	 specific	
																																																						64	Carter	(‘Is	the	Capability	Approach	Paternalist?’,	pp.92-93)	insists	that	capability	theorists	deny	that	freedom	has	content-independent	value,	 though	Pettit	has	argued	 for	understanding	 freedom	in	 the	capability	approach	as	content-independent	(Philip	Pettit,	‘Capability	and	Freedom:	A	Defence	of	Sen’,	
Economics	and	Philosophy	 17	 (2007):	 1-20;	 a	modification	 I	 accept	 (Begon,	 ‘Athletic	 Policy,	 Passive	Well-Being)).		65	Carter,	‘Is	the	Capability	Approach	Paternalist?’,	p.96.	Whilst	in	this	example	individuals	are	given	a	single	 good	 (cash)	 rather	 than	 a	 range,	 insofar	 as	 primary	 goods	 are	 taken	 to	 be	 things	 that	 every	rational	 person	 will	 want,	 whatever	 their	 goals,	 then	 Carter’s	 focus	 on	 all-purpose-means	 seems	compatible	with	the	approaches	of	Rawls,	and	Rawlsians,	such	as	Pogge.		66	Carter,	‘Is	the	Capability	Approach	Paternalist?’,	p.92	67	Ronald	 Dworkin,	 Sovereign	Virtue:	The	Theory	and	Practice	 of	Equality,	 (Cambridge,	MA:	 Harvard	University	Press,	2000),	p.61;	Elizabeth	Anderson,	‘What	is	the	Point	of	Equality?’,	Ethics	109:	287-337,	p.332.	Welfarists	 and	 some	 resourcists	may	 dispute	 this,	 but	 therein	 lies	 the	 distinctiveness	 of	 the	capability	 approach.	 I	 provide	 a	 more	 complete	 defence	 of	 this	 position	 elsewhere	 (Jessica	 Begon,	(unpublished	 ms.),	 ‘Needs,	 Desires,	 and	 Disadvantage:	 Determining	 Distributive	 Entitlements	 for	Disabled	Individuals’).	
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capabilities,	 then,	 can	 be	 compatible	with	 the	 provision	 of	 non-specific	 freedom	 if	they	are	capabilities	to	control,	not	capabilities	to	function.		
	
4.2	Objections	to	the	Modification		To	finish,	I	will	consider	some	potential	objections.	These	are,	briefly,	first,	that	I	still	make	 too	 many	 assumptions	 about	 what	 is	 valuable	 in	 human	 life,	 and	 so	unjustifiably	 rule	 out	 some	 conceptions	 of	 the	 good.	 Second,	 that	 I	 make	 too	 few	assumptions	 about	what	 is	 valuable,	 and	 so	will	 allow	 individuals	 to	make	 deeply	harmful	decisions,	and,	indeed,	promote	and	support	such	‘bad’	functionings.	Finally,	that	there	is	no	significant	difference	between	Nussbaum’s	view	and	my	own.			First,	then,	although	this	approach	makes	fewer	value	assumptions	than	Nussbaum’s,	it	may	be	objected	that	it	‘writes-in’	a	commitment	to	autonomy,	and	forces	choice	on	those	who	 do	 not	 value	 it.	 For	 example,	 a	 religious	 conservative	might	 agree	 that	human	 sexuality	 is	 important,	 but	 vehemently	 disagree	 that	 our	 choices	 in	 this	domain	 should	 be	 open,	 limited	 by	 nothing	 but	 a	 concern	 for	 the	 consent	 of,	 and	potential	 harm	 to,	 others.	 They	 may	 object	 even	 more	 to	 being	 expected	 to	 fund	others’	choices	in	this	domain.			In	response,	I	can	only	say	that	a	commitment	to	autonomy	is	a	necessary	feature	of	most	 liberal	 positions	 and,	 given	 that	 I	 am	 mounting	 an	 internal	 critique	 of	Nussbaum,	 I	 will	 not	 attempt	 to	 defend	 liberalism	 to	 non-liberals.	 Insofar	 as	 the	capability	approach	is	understood	as	a	liberal	approach,	then,	the	value	of	autonomy	must	be	assumed.	That	this	is	incompatible	with	the	values	of	illiberal	and	intolerant	individuals	should	not	necessarily	concern	us.	First,	though	individuals	are	provided	with	 the	capacity	 to	set	and	pursue	their	own	ends	 in	certain	domains	of	 their	 life,	they	 are	 not	 forced	 to	 choose	 autonomy-centred	 goals.	 It	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	approach	to	allow	individuals	to	use	the	control	they	are	provided	to	choose	a	way	of	life	that	makes	little	active	use	of	this	control.68			If	the	concern	is,	 instead,	that	individuals	will	resent	allowing,	and	indeed	enabling,	others	 to	 have	 such	 control,	 then	 I	would	 follow	Nussbaum,	who	 frequently	 notes	
																																																						68	We	might	worry	 that	we	would	 still	 express	expressive	 subordination	of	 those	who	chose	a	non-autonomous	life.	However,	autonomy	is	important	only	as	a	means	to	the	end	of	allowing	individuals	to	 pursue	 their	 own	 conception	 of	 the	 good.	 There	 need	 be	 no	 assumption	 that	 individuals	 should	choose	 a	 life	 involving	 autonomy,	 or	maintain	 their	 autonomy	over	 time.	 Perfectionist	 liberals	may	object	to	this	approach	for	just	this	reason	(for	example,	Clare	Chambers,	Sex,	Culture,	and	Justice:	The	
Limits	of	Choice,	(State	College,	PA:	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	2008),	pp.159-202).	However,	liberal	neutrality	requires	that	choices	are	not	limited,	or	ways	of	life	deemed	worse,	on	the	basis	of	their	content.		
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that	 it	 is	 self-subverting	 to	 tolerate	 the	 intolerant,	 or	 to	 defend	 “strongly	nonrelativistic”	 local	 norms	 out	 of	 a	 commitment	 to	 relativism.69	Further,	 political	liberalism	only	requires	that	individuals	be	enabled	to	pursue	their	own	conception	of	 the	good,	not	 that	 they	are	enabled	 to	 force	 this	 conception	on	others	 (however	much	they	would	value	 the	chance	 to	do	so).	For	 this	reason,	as	Nelson	notes,	 “the	exclusion	 of	 liberty-violating	 accounts	 of	 the	 good	 life	 is	 the	 only	 departure	 from	neutrality	 explicitly	 allowed	 in…[Rawls’s]	 theory”70.	 Thus,	 individuals	 are	 allowed	the	opportunity	to	pursue	their	conception	of	the	good	in	domains	of	their	own	 life,	but	denied	the	opportunity	to	limit	others’	freedoms,	through	act	or	omission.	This	is	consistent	 with	 Nussbaum’s	 political	 liberalism,	 and	 I	 will	 not	 defend	 this	commitment	further	here.			An	alternative	objection	may	be	 that	rather	 than	assuming	too	much,	 the	approach	assumes	 too	 little:	 by	 providing	 individuals	 with	 relatively	 abstract	 opportunities,	and	 allowing	 them	 to	 function	 as	 they	wish,	 the	 approach	has	 no	 recourse	 against	individuals	 making	 ‘bad’	 choices.	 Further,	 it	 may	 support	 or	 even	 promote	 such	choices.	Nussbaum	allows	exceptions	 to	her	 commitment	 to	promoting	capabilities	(§2.2)	out	of	concern	that	individuals	may	misuse	them,	and	even	give	up	their	future	capabilities.	Claassen	and	Düwell	are	 further	concerned	that	Nussbaum’s	capability	approach	 may	 justify	 supporting	 ‘dark’	 capabilities.71	In	 their	 discussion	 of	 the	Humourless	Warrior,	they	note	that	cruelty	and	aggression	are	actual	human	abilities,	and	 that	Nussbaum	cannot	 successfully	distinguish	 the	 abilities	 that	 exert	 a	 ‘moral	claim’	 to	 be	 protected	 and	 developed	 from	 those	 that	 do	 not.	 They	 argue	 that	we	should	 distinguish	 the	 morally	 required	 and	 permissible	 capabilities	 from	 the	morally	 bad	 capabilities	 (such	 as	 cruelty	 and	 aggression).	 Then,	within	 the	 former	category,	we	 should	 identify	 those	 that	 are	 “weighty	 enough”	 to	 “deserve	 political	protection”,	though	they	do	not	yet	say	“how	and	when”	such	judgements	should	be	made.72			In	response,	it	should	be	pointed	out,	first,	that	the	capability	approach	will	not	allow	individuals	to	develop	and	exercise	capabilities	such	that	they	inhibit	the	capabilities	of	 others.	 A	 central	 concern	 for	 both	 Nussbaum	 and	 Sen	 is	 the	 separateness	 of	persons,	 and	 they	 vehemently	 oppose	 utilitarian	 approaches	 that	 aggregate	individual	interests.	We	can	assume,	then,	that	any	version	of	the	capability	approach	will	 not	 allow	 someone	 to	 exercise	 their	 capabilities	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 it	 causes	someone	else	to	fall	below	the	specified	capability	threshold	of	some	other	capability.	
																																																						69	Nussbaum,	Women	and	Human	Development,	p.49	70	Nelson,	‘From	Primary	Goods	to	Capabilities’,	p.102	71	Claassen	and	Düwell,	‘The	Foundations	of	Capability	Theory’,	pp.495-498	72	Claassen	and	Düwell,	‘The	Foundations	of	Capability	Theory’,	p.497	
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Thus,	the	Warrior	would	not	have	his	capacity	for	aggression	enabled	if	this	requires	the	provision	of	a	stream	of	victims	on	which	to	exercise	such	aggression.			Leaving	 aside	 cases	 of	 harm	 to	 others,	 then,	 should	 we	 be	 concerned	 that	 this	approach	may	promote	 ‘unvirtuous’	 functionings?	 Should	 the	Warrior	 be	 provided	with	 outlets	 for	 his	 aggression?	 Should	 individuals	 be	 allowed	 to	 use	 their	 control	over	 their	 health	 to	 undergo	 non-essential,	 and	 seemingly	 harmful,	 medical	procedures,	such	as	FGC	or	 the	voluntary	removal	of	a	healthy	 limb?	 I	do	not	deny	that	my	approach	would	allow	for	these	conclusions,	but	I	consider	this	a	benefit	of	a	liberal,	 anti-perfectionist,	 anti-paternalist	 approach,	 and	 a	 failure	 of	 Nussbaum’s	account	 that	 she	does	 not	 reach	 these	 conclusions.73	We	may	not	 like	 the	Warrior,	but	that	does	not	justify	our	preventing	him	exercising	the	capability	for	aggression	on	willing	participants	–	for	example,	through	sports	such	as	boxing	or	martial	arts,	or	on	masochists.			Whether	 such	 functionings	 would	 be	 supported	 and	 ‘politically	 protected’	 may	depend	on	the	function	that	aggression	serves	for	the	Warrior,	and	which	domain	of	control	it	would	fall	under.	It	may	be	part	of	his	capability	for	sexual	satisfaction,	and	I	 would	 certainly	 support	 safe	 and	 consensual	 BDSM	 being	 protected	 by	governments:	for	example,	decriminalisation	of	these	practices.74	If	this	is	part	of	his	capability	for	play	and	recreation	then,	again,	this	may	warrant	some	governmental	support:	for	example,	tax	breaks	for	martial	arts	clubs.	There	seems	unlikely	to	be	a	consensus	on	the	centrality	to	a	dignified	human	life	of	control	over	aggression	for	its	own	sake,	so	this	is	unlikely	to	be	a	domain	of	control	in	its	own	right.			I	 follow	Nussbaum	 (and	most	 theorists	 of	 justice)	 in	 acknowledging	 that	we	must	distinguish	between	those	goals	and	domains	that	are	a	concern	of	justice	and	those	that	are	not.	My	objection	to	Nussbaum	is	that	within	the	domains	that	are	a	concern	
of	justice,	she	supports	 some	conceptions	of	 the	good	and	not	others.	To	point	out,	then,	that	my	approach	will	support	and	protect	various	non-standard	conceptions	of	the	 good	 is	 not	 to	 critique	 my	 approach	 but	 to	 state	 it	 (and	 one	 of	 its	 primary	
																																																						73	I	am	certainly	not	suggesting	that	FGC	as	it	is	currently	practiced	–	forcibly,	against	young	girls,	in	unsterile	 conditions	 –	 should	 be	 permitted.	 Rather,	 I	 contend	 that	 if	 the	 procedure	 was	 chosen	voluntarily,	by	consenting	adults,	 then	political	 liberals	 should	not	 interfere	with	 this	 self-regarding	decision.	(Nussbaum	attempts	(unsuccessfully)	to	maintain	that	political	liberalism	is	consistent	with	a	ban	on	FGC	(Nussbaum,	Sex	and	Social	Justice,	pp.118-129).	Clare	Chambers	sees	the	need	for	such	a	ban	as	one	reason	to	abandon	political	liberalism	(Chambers,	Sex,	Culture,	and	Justice,	pp.159-202).)	74	See,	for	example,	David	Archard,	 ‘The	Wrong	of	Rape’,	The	Philosophical	Quarterly	57	(2007):	374-393,	p.378,	 for	 a	discussion	of	 the	 consequences	of	 criminalising	 this	practice.	As	with	other	 sexual	functionings	 it	 is	unlikely	 to	require	much	positive	support,	and	 if	 the	Warrior	cannot	 find	a	willing	partner,	the	government	would	probably	not	be	obliged	to	provide	one.	I	will	not,	however,	consider	the	details	of	how	such	capabilities	should	be	operationalised	as	policy,	here.		
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attractions).	The	aim	of	my	approach	is	to	ensure	that	we	have	substantive	support	not	just	to	perform	a	functioning	–	for	example,	to	be	healthy	–	and	the	chance	not	to	perform	it.	We	should	also	have	the	substantive	opportunity	to	be	what	is	‘unhealthy’	on	many	 views:	 to	 live	with	 ASC	 or	 deafness	 or	 blindness;	 to	 amputate	 a	 limb;	 to	engage	in	sexual	activities	that	leave	bruises	or	scars,	or	engage	in	no	sexual	activity	at	all.	Many	may	reject	such	strident	liberalism,	but	a	liberal	is	what	Nussbaum	sets	out	 to	 be,	 and	 this	 is	 not	 achieved	 with	 mere	 capabilities	 to	 function.	 Where	Nussbaum	 is	unwilling	 to	allow	 individuals	 to	sacrifice	 their	 capability	 for	health,	 I	would	 argue	 for	 policies	 that	 support	 their	 ability	 to	 perform	 these	 supposedly	unhealthy	acts.		This	brings	us	 to	 the	 final	 objection,	which	 is	 that	despite	 such	disagreements,	my	approach	is	no	different	from	Nussbaum’s	own.	Whilst	Nussbaum	talks	of	capabilities	to	function	perhaps	she	ultimately	has	in	mind	something	more	like	the	capability	to	control	 these	 parts	 of	 our	 life,	 as	 I	 suggest.	 Certainly	 I	 take	 my	 proposal	 to	 be	consistent	with	the	central	commitments	of	Nussbaum’s	approach,	yet	it	is	not	clear	that	 she	 could	 straightforwardly	 accept	my	modification.	 First,	 she	would	 need	 to	abandon	the	policies,	which	appear	throughout	her	work,	that	promote	functionings	rather	than	capabilities,	or	protect	the	abilities	to	perform	certain	functionings.	Thus,	for	example,	she	could	not	remain	committed	to	a	ban	on	voluntary	FGC.	Nor	could	she	suggest	that	impairments	such	as	ASC	or	Down’s	syndrome	should	be	cured,	and	that	 individuals	with	 these	 conditions	 should	 be	 enabled,	 as	 a	matter	 of	 justice,	 to	function	‘normally’	(i.e.	perform	the	central	functionings).	Second,	she	would	need	to	abandon	 the	 language	 of	 valuable	 functionings,	 and	 of	 capabilities	 as	 the	 ability	 to	perform	 these	 functionings.	 She	 would	 also	 need	 to	 abandon	 the	 idea	 that	 “an	implicit	 theory	of	value”	must	be	used	 to	 identify	 those	preferences	 that	 should	be	included	in	the	overlapping	consensus.75			Despite	 the	prevalence	of	 these	 commitments	 throughout	her	work,	 it	may	 still	 be	maintained	that	my	understanding	of	capabilities	can	be	seen	as	an	interpretation	of	Nussbaum’s	 work	 rather	 than	 a	 modification	 of	 it.	 Whilst	 this	 does	 not	 seem	plausible	 to	 me,	 I	 need	 not	 object:	 nothing	 hangs	 on	 whether	 the	 label	 of	interpretation	or	modification	 is	 applied	 to	my	approach.	What	does	matter	 is	 that	the	 currently	 prevalent	 (indeed,	 near	 universal)	 interpretation	 of	 capabilities	 is	 as	opportunities	 to	 perform	 valuable	 functionings,	 and	 that	 this	 interpretation	 leaves	the	capability	approach	vulnerable	 to	 the	charge	 that	 it	excludes	 those	who	cannot	perform,	or	do	not	value,	these	functionings.	Whether	interpretation	or	modification,	
																																																						75	Martha	Nussbaum,	‘Symposium	on	Amartya	Sen’s	philosophy:	5	Adaptive	preferences	and	women’s	options’,	Economics	and	Philosophy	17	(2001):	67-88,	p.74	
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capabilities	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 opportunities	 to	 exercise	 control,	 and	redistributive	policies	designed	with	this	in	mind.				
5.	Conclusion		Individuals	 who	 cannot	 perform,	 or	 do	 not	 value,	 the	 functionings	 Nussbaum	considers	central	undermine	the	possibility	of	an	overlapping	consensus	on	her	list	of	capabilities,	since	this	asks	them	to	agree	that	performing	a	functioning	of	which	they	are	 incapable	 is	necessary	 to	a	dignified	 life.	Further,	providing	capabilities	 to	function	 to	 these	 individuals	 involves	 the	 insulting	 offer	 of	 cures	 (so	 they	 can	function	‘normally’),	and	does	not	provide	them	with	the	substantive	opportunity	to	pursue	 those	 functioning	 they	 do	 value,	when	 these	 differ	 from	 the	 norm.	 Yet	 this	should	 not	 lead	 us	 to	 abandon	 our	 focus	 on	 capabilities,	 or	 to	 sacrifice	 the	 more	exotic	 or	 unusual	 capabilities,	 on	 which	 agreement	 may	 seem	 difficult.	 Instead,	capabilities	should	be	understood	as	opportunities	to	control	certain	domains	of	our	life,	remaining	neutral	regarding	the	proper	use	that	should	be	made	of	such	control.	This	 includes	 those	who	 cannot	 perform	 the	 ‘normal’	 functionings	 in	 this	 domain,	and	provides	them	with	something	they	can	possess,	and	reasonably	be	expected	to	value:	 the	substantive	opportunity	 to	 form	and	pursue	 their	own	conception	of	 the	good,	however	much	this	deviates	from	what	we	think	a	normal	human	life	should	be	like.			
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